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FAIR HOUSING TESTING: ITS LEGAL STATUS AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Peter E. Millspaught
Segregation in housing remains pervasive despite legislative at-
tempts to end housing discrimination. The lack of a meaningful
en orcement scheme has forced private litigants to seek their
remedyfor housing discrimination through the courts. To pres-
ent aprima/acie case of housing discrimination, private litigants
have used individuals known as "testers, " who pose as renters or
home seekers in an attempt to secure evidence of disparate treat-
ment. Although courts have accepted tester evidence as a neces-
sary evil in exposing housing discrimination, the widespread use
of tester evidence imposes signocant costs on society and should
not become the cornerstone Of a nationalfair housing enforce-
ment scheme.$
I. INTRODUCTION
Two scenarios have become familiar fact patterns in the civil
rights arena. In the first,' a minority applicant responding to an adver-
tisement arranges to view a rental unit, but is told that the dwelling is
no longer available. Suspecting that he is the object of race discrimina-
tion, he contacts a nonprofit organization devoted to the promotion of
integrated housing in the metropolitan area. A white individual from
t B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, 1958; M.A., Georgetown Uni-
versity, 1963; J.D., Washington College of Law, The American University, 1968.
Mr. Millspaugh is an Associate Professor of Business Legal Studies, George Ma-
son University, Fairfax, Virginia.
: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the policies or opinions of the LAW REVIEW, its editors and staff, or the
University of Baltimore.
1. See, e.g., Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081, 1083-85 (7th
Cir. 1982) (minority told townhouse already rented; subsequent white applicant
told same townhouse still available); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc.,
648 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1980) (minority told office not available because man-
ager wanted to use it; white friend posing as a secretary later told that office was
available); Blockman v. Sandalwood Apartments, 613 F.2d 169, 170-71 (7th Cir.
1980) (minority told no apartments were available; following day white tester told
apartments were available); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 552-53 (8th Cir.
1977) (black renter told that no apartment available; white female tester told the
next day that the apartment was available); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536
F.2d 231, 233-35 (8th Cir. 1976) (black woman told no apartment available; white
tester told she could move in the next day).
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the organization then applies for the apartment, not with a desire to
rent the unit, but instead for the purpose of gathering evidence of race
discrimination. The landlord accepts the white tester's2 application.
In the second scenario,3 a small area of a racially integrated metro-
politan neighborhood gradually becomes concentrated with black
home owners. This causes certain people in and around the neighbor-
hood to suspect that the real estate brokers in the area are engaged in
racial steering.4 With the assistance of a housing activist group, several
individuals, caucasion and black, are quietly recruited for a special as-
signment. Behind false identities and the pretense of an interest in
purchasing a home in the area, their mission is to approach the offices
of a real estate firm servicing the area in search of housing discrimina-
tion. These individuals engage the services of the owner and sales
agents of the realty firm on numerous occasions over several weeks.
Sensitized to illegal discriminatory behavior, armed with carefully
designed questions, and on occasion acting in ways that will lead the
real estate agents to believe they are racially biased, these recruits gar-
ner evidence they deem sufficiently incriminating to constitute viola-
tions of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.1 In both instances, once the test
2. Testers can generally be described as individuals who have absolutely no interest
in obtaining the property involved, but instead test the reaction of real estate
agents, landlords, or sellers to determine the presence of racial discrimination. In
the context of a racial steering case, the Supreme Court defined testers as
"[i]ndividuals who, without an intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment,
pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful
steering practices." Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
3. See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93-95 (1979)
(realtors charged with steering black homeowners into a target area of integrated
neighborhood); Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816, 818-19 (10th Cir.
1981) (realtor charged with steering blacks into cul-de-sac because of race); Sher-
man Park Community Ass'n v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 486 F. Supp. 838, 840
(E.D. Wis. 1980) (realtor charged with steering blacks from white neighborhoods,
and' whites from black or integrated neighborhoods); Village of Bellwood v.
Dwayne Realty, 482 F. Supp. 1321, 1323 (N.D. IUI. 1979) (neighborhood became
concentrated with black homeowners); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1047-
48 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (defendants attempted to steer blacks into certain neighbor-
hoods), af'd, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977).
4. The Supreme Court has defined racial steering as "directing prospective
homebuyers interested in equivalent properties to different areas according to
their race." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94 (1979); see
also R. HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS
143-54 (1969); Note, Real Estate Steering and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 12
TULSA L.J. 758, 760 (1976); Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and
Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 809-12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Real Estate
Broker].
5. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976)); see infra notes 18-22 and accompany-
ing text.
Two recent books provide a comprehensive analysis of fair housing law. See
J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION (1983); R. SCHwEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMI-
NATION LAW (1983).
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is completed a complaint is filed in federal district court alleging that
the landlord or realty firm is engaged in the illegal practice of housing
discrimination.
In recent years, Congress has embraced the concept of increased
private enforcement activity to serve the public interest.6 In the hous-
mng field, litigation is thus encouraged where the complainants, not only
on their own behalf, but also as private attorneys general, act to pro-
mote the public interest by eliminating housing discrimination. This is
a policy that Congress considers to be of the highest priority.7 Further
support for fair housing testing can be construed from judicial accept-
ance of the private attorneys general rationale in the civil rights area.'
In addition, testing advocates have found the federal government to be
a willing participant and ready source of financial support in recent
years.9
In the late 1970's, the practice of fair housing testing became insti-
tutionalized. Beginning in 1975, the task of measuring the extent of
racial discrimination in the nation's housing markets was funded by the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD)."° To examine discriminatory housing practices, this study
used information gained from fair housing testing. Forty metropolitan
areas were tested throughout the country employing a network of some
600 testers, 40 tester supervisors and their assistants, and 40 local spon-
6. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976) (original
version at ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946)); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V
1983) (original version at ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)); Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976) (original versions at ch. 687, Title I, § 18, 49
Stat. 831 (1935), ch. 404, Title I, § 9, 48 Stat. 889 (1934)); Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. 1983)
(original version at Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 943 (1970));
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1983) (original version at ch.
676, § 16, 52 Stat. 1069 (1938)); patent laws, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976) (original ver-
sion at ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 813 (1952)); Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 206
(1976) (original version at ch. 652, Title II, § 206, 48 Stat. 1072 (1934)).
7. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
The concept of private attorneys general, however, has not been free from
attack, especially in the area of fee awards. See generally Coffee, Rescuing the
Private Attorney General Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not
Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 220 (1983) (problem stems from incentive struc-
ture current law offers to the private enforcer).
8. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 756 (1980) (civil rights
statutes award the prevailing party attorney's fees); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
670 F.2d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 1982) (congressional goal of eliminating discrimination
in employment serves to encourage private litigants to bring Title VII actions).
9. See infra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Pierce Backs Continued Use of
"Testers" to Combat Housing Discrimination, 10 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 404
(1982). But see The Washington Post, Jan. 4, 1983, at A13, col. 1 (federal support
for fair housing activity may have been temporarily discontinued under Reagan
administration).
10. U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV., MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
AMERICAN HOUSING MARKETS (1979) [hereinafter cited as HUD STUDY].
soring individuals and organizations." The government's first pub-
fished report of this project demonstrated the usefulness of testing as a
research tool, and as "an especially important tool in enforcing laws." 12
The foundation was thus laid, and government funding of fair housing
organizations to support testing programs throughout the country
began.
Initially, this article examines the historical background and en-
forcement of the Fair Housing Act. The article then scrutinizes the
premises and methods associated with current forms of fair housing
testing, followed by an analysis of the judicial response to fair housing
testing. Finally, the article surveys the present state of the law from a
public policy perspective focusing on a fair housing enforcement strat-
egy that is based on the widespread use of private testing.
II. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The need for private enforcement to assist the elimination of hous-
ing discrimination is based in part on this country's belated response to
this form of discrimination. 3 Although Congress, in enacting the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,14 had unequivocally declared that all citizens of the
United States had the same rights as white citizens to purchase, sell,
lease, hold, or convey real and personal property,' 5 it was more than
100 years before the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ,16
held that the 1866 Civil Rights Act prohibited private as well as public
discrimination against blacks in the sale and rental of property.' 7
In the same year as Jones, Congress enacted Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Act.'I In its opening section the
statute declares that "[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide,
11. Id atv.
12. Id at 203. The report stated:
The usefulness of testing for enforcement is evidenced by the use of the
[testing] data by the Department of Justice. As of December, 1978, Jus-
tice had used the [testing] data to initiate over 100 FBI investigations of
suspected discriminators. It is expected that the information supplied on
individual firms and agents suspected of discriminating will have signifi-
cant enforcement benefits.
Id
13. For a discussion of racial housing segregation ordinances in Baltimore in the early
20th century, see Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style.- The Residential Segregation
Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REv. 289 (1983).
14. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)).
15. Id
16. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17. Id at 421. In 1962, President Kennedy took the first significant step by the federal
government to end racial discrimination in federally-assisted housing. See Exec.
Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1976).
18. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, §§ 801-19, 82 Stat. 81,
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976)).
218 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 13
1984] Fair Housing Testing 219
within constitutional limits, for fair housing throughout the United
States."' 9 The operative segment of the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, de-
fines and makes unlawful five types of racially discriminatory activ-
ity. 2° In addition, it is unlawful under this section to deny a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,2 or
to discriminate in providing services or facilities associated with the
sale or rental of real estate. 22 Thus, by its operative provisions, Title
VIII clearly prohibits the consideration of race and other similar classi-
fications in the sale and rental of housing in the United States. Despite
this coverage, the residential segregation of blacks in both the sale 23
19. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976).
20. The portion of this statute that proscribes various discriminatory practices in the
sale or rental of housing states that it is unlawful:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or
to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavail-
able or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the
sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or
an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale,
or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or
rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective
entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id § 3604. Most courts that have held that racial steering violates the Fair Hous-
ing Act have done so under § 3604(a) on the ground that racial steering serves to
make unavailable or deny a dwelling to a prospective buyer on the basis of race.
See, e.g., Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Real
Estate One, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Fair Housing Council of
Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F.
Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976); United States v. Henshaw Bros., 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.
Va. 1974); Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aft'd, 547 F.2d
1168 (6th Cir. 1976).
Despite the scope of § 3604(a), § 3604(b) arguably provides broader protec-
tion against racial steering. See Note, Real Estate Broker, supra note 4, at 818-21.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976). By contrast, suits under 42 U.S.(. § 1982 are limited
to race discrimination. See supra text accompanying note 17.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1976).
23. A national survey found that blacks seeking to purchase a home had a 62% chance
of encountering discrimination when visiting four different sales agents. See
HUD STUDY, supra note 10.
The suggestion that more blacks do not purchase homes in suburban areas
because of lower income levels is too shallow an explanation of the segregation
phenomenon. See D. WARFIELD, A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF
BALTIMORE CITY BLACK FAMILIES FOR LIVING IN BALTIMORE COUNTY AND THE
OTHER SUBURBAN COUNTIES 3-7 (1980) (published by Baltimore Neighborhoods,
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 13
and rental24 of housing persists.
Those who have analyzed the continuing problem of housing dis-
crimination invariably place some of the blame on the enforcement
scheme contained in Title VIII.25 Indeed, some metropolitan areas,
fearing that the enforcement scheme will not suffice to produce residen-
tial integration, have enacted integration maintenance programs
designed to create and maintain stable interracial balances.26 Title
VIII in fact contains three methods of attack on housing discrimina-
tion. First, a person may submit a complaint to the Secretary of
HUD.2 7 Second, the United States Attorney General, acting through
the United States Department of Justice (Justice Department), is au-
thorized to bring suit when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a
pattern or practice of discrimination has become an issue of general
importance.2" Finally, the complainant, acting as a private attorney
general,29 can immediately file suit in federal district court or a state
Inc.) (black families have the ability to purchase and lease property in suburban
Baltimore); see also BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOODS, INC., A STUDY OF THE REAL
ESTATE PRACTICES BY RACE IN WEST AND NORTHWEST BALTIMORE COUNTY
(1982) (extensive racial discrimination and steering against buyers in these sec-
tions of Baltimore County); BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOODS, INC., A STUDY OF THE
REAL ESTATE PRACTICES BY RACE IN THE HARBEL AREA OF NORTHEAST BALTI-
MORE CITY (1981) (racial discrimination and steering against minority buyers in
the Harbel area).
24. HUD STUDY, supra note 10 (blacks seeking rental housing faced a 75% chance of
encountering bias when visiting four rental agents); see also BALTIMORE NEIGH-
BORHOODS, INC., APARTMENT DISCRIMINATION IN BALTIMORE COUNTY AND
CITY 1982 (1983) (audit of 35 randomly selected apartments in Baltimore City
and Baltimore County revealed a difference of treatment of blacks in 46% of the
apartment complexes tested).
25. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING
ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 29, 30-32 (1979); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RE-
PORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES: STRONGER ENFORCEMENT NEEDED TO UPHOLD FAIR HOUSING LAWS
(1978) (HUD needs powers to enforce Title VIII) [hereinafter cited as GAO RE-
PORT]; Comment, Racial Discrimination in the Private Housing Sector.- Five Years
After, 33 MD. L. REV. 289 (1973); Note, Is the US, Committed to Fair Housing?
Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act Remains a Crucial Problem, 29 CATH. L.
REV. 641 (1980) (legislation designed to carry out equal opportunity in housing
has proven to be largely unenforceable).
26. See generally Smolla, Integration Maintenance. The Unconstitutionality of Benign
Programs that Discourage Black Entry to Prevent White Flight, 1981 DUKE L.J.
891 (integration maintenance programs are unconstitutional); Comment, Benign
Steering and Benign Quotas." The Validity of Race- Conscious Policies to Promote
Residential Integration, 93 HARV. L. REv. 938 (1980) (municipal integration main-
tenance programs do not violate Title VIII or the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976).
28. Id § 3613.
29. The phrase "private attorney general" was first used by Judge Frank in Associ-
ated Indus. of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.) (Congress
can confer standing on persons, not simply to recover compensation for specific
victims, but also "to vindicate the public interest. Such persons so authorized, are,
so to speak, private Attorney Generals"), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
19841 Fair Housing Testing
court of general jurisdiction. 0
Despite these enumerated means of enforcement, the effectiveness
of the remedial schemes vary in both speed and uniformity of result.
The administrative procedure of filing a complaint through HUD has
been criticized for delays in investigation and unsuccessful resolution
of complaints.3 The HUD procedure relies upon "conference, concili-
ation and persuasion," and permits suit in federal court only if concilia-
tion fails to produce compliance.3 2 Yet, federal efforts to secure
compliance through HUD is withheld pending state action if the state
has enacted legislation that is the substantial equivalent to Title VIII.
3
30. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976).
31. Id § 3610(a)-(b), (d).
32. See Comment, supra note 25, at 317-18; Note, supra note 25, at 652-53.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1976). Thirty states have enacted legislation deemed to be
the substantial equivalent of the federal statute. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.200-
290 (1981); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (West 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-
501 to -510 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-58 (West Supp. 1984); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4601-4613 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 3-101 to
-106 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-2 (Bums Supp. 1983);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 601 A.8 (West Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1015 to
-1016 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.360 (Baldwin 1979); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4581-4583 (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 19-28 (1979);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 37.1501-507 (West Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp.
1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-105 to -116
(Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118.100 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8
(Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-1-7 (1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.033 (1981); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 953-955 (Purdon Supp. 1984); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 34-37-1 to -4 (Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-20
(Supp. 1983); VA. CODE §§ 36-88 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49-60-222
(Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22
(West Supp. 1983). Similarly, the following local jurisdictions have substantially
equivalent laws: Phoenix, Ariz., New Haven, Conn., Washington, D.C., Clearwa-
ter, Fla., Jacksonville, Fla., Orlando, Fla., St. Petersburg, Fla., Bloomington, Ill.,
Evanston, Ill., Springfield, Ill., Columbus, Ind., Fort Wayne, Ind., Gary, Ind.,
South Bend, Ind., Iowa City, Iowa, Kansas City, Kan., Salina, Kan., Wichita,
Kan., Howard County, Md., Montgomery County, Md., Prince George's County,
Md., Minneapolis, Minn., Kansas City, Mo., Lincoln, Neb., Omaha, Neb., New
York City, N.Y., Charlotte, N.C., Mecklenburg County, N.C., New Hanover
County, N.C., Raleigh, N.C., Philadelphia, Pa., Pittsburg, Pa., Sioux Falls, S.D.,
Knoxville, Tenn., Seattle, Wash., Tacoma, Wash., Beckley, W. Va., Charlestown,
W. Va., Hunington, W. Va., Beloit, Wis. See generallv 24 C.F.R. § 115.11 (1983)
(listing of jurisdictions).
Further, the following three states and seven jurisdictions have enacted laws
that are currently under proposal for substantially equivalent designation: Flor-
ida, Hawaii, North Carolina, Pensacola, Fla., Tallahassee, Fla., Park Forest, Ill.,
Olathe, Kan., Detroit, Mich., Allentown, Pa., Fort Worth, Tex. 49 Fed. Reg. 5,939
(1984) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 115.11) (proposed Feb. 16, 1984). See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 23-167 (West Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 515-3 to -8 (1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4 (Supp. 1983).
For the criteria used by HUD in making this determination, see HUD, Rec-
ognition of Substantially Equivalent Laws, 24 C.F.R. § 115.3 (1983).
In Maryland, state law prohibits discrimination in the sale and rental of
housing. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 19-28 (1979). The Maryland Human Rela-
Baltimore Law Review
Thus, where the state has enacted this type of legislation, the individ-
ual complaint filed with HUD is delegated to the state or local agency
for attempts to achieve enforcement.
Although the federal statute reflects the determination that the
problem of housing discrimination should be handled by the state or
local government, this procedure results in inevitable delay as the com-
plaint is passed through the federal and state bureaucracies. The HUD
enforcement procedure automatically delays the filing of a lawsuit for
thirty days,34 and probably longer if the complaint must be forwarded
to a state or local agency. The delay in investigation may well result in
an inability to secure the desired housing35 since a bona fide purchaser
without actual notice is not affected by a subsequent agency reconcilia-
tion or court decision.36 Moreover, HUD has no power to preserve the
status quo until the final disposition of the complaint.37 Even if the
administrative procedure results in an agreement in the individual
complaint, there may be no protection against future housing violations
by the same party. The agreement itself may be unenforceable and
thus the realtor, seller, or lessor is held to a mere moral obligation.38
The second method of enforcement is by the Attorney General
acting through the Justice Department. The focus of the Justice De-
partment attack on housing discrimination is necessarily aimed at the
large housing providers. 39 Despite this focus, the housing market is
predominately comprised of independent landlords, sellers, and real es-
tate brokers. The nature of the Justice Department litigation thus can-
not act as an effective deterrent in the housing industry. Moreover, the
number of cases brought by the Justice Department has slowed in re-
cent years to a pace where in the three year period from 1981 to 1983
tions Commission is charged with administrative responsibility. Id § 19. For a
discussion of the Maryland fair housing statute, see Comment, supra note 25, at
314-25.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1976).
35. The following statistics were provided on May 25, 1984 in a telephone interview
with Katrina Ross, Fair Housing Enforcement Division, HUD:
Number and
Number of Percentage of Number and Percentage of Successful
Complaints Successful Conciliation in which complainant was
Received Conciliations able to secure contested housing
1981 4,209 829 (19.6%) 310 (7.4%)
1982 5,112 946 (18.5%) 340 (6.7%)
1983 4,551 1102 (24.2%) 411 (9.0%)
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1976).
37. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
38. Although HUD has no enforcement power, the agreement may be enforceable in
a jurisdiction that has enacted substantially equivalent laws. See supra note 33
and accompanying text.
In Maryland, for example, such an agreement is enforceable through the
Maryland Human Relations Commission. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 12 (1979).
39. Under Title VIII, the Justice Department is authorized to bring suit only when
there is a pattern or practice of discrimination such that the discrimination has
become an issue of general importance. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1976).
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only nine Title VIII cases were filed by the United States.4" This mea-
ger enforcement activity is hardly enough to serve even the symbolic
role of previous years and provides little conciliation to the individual
aggrieved party. For this reason, the bulk of fair housing enforcement
activity is left to private litigation efforts, often proved through the use
of fair housing testing.
III. AN ANATOMY OF FAIR HOUSING TESTING
The practice of fair housing testing is little known outside of hous-
ing activist circles and segments of the real estate industry. Even more
obscure perhaps are the means employed in the testing. A composite of
techniques and methods that make up the fair housing test can be as-
sembled by examining the literature emanating from both the govern-
ment and various fair housing organizations. The test has been
described by its practitioners as:
[a] study done to determine the difference in quality, content,
and quantity of information and service given to clients by
real estate firms and rental property managers that could only
result from a difference in the client's race. The audit [test] is
conducted under the supervision of a coordinator who sends
teams of trained volunteers to well-known real estate compa-
nies to pass as homeseekers. Each team is matched according
to income, family size, general appearance, etc. - every fac-
tor except skin color. Each member of the team is sent to the
same agency at closely spaced intervals presenting similar
housing desires. Each volunteer then keeps detailed accounts
of his experiences in the categories being tested.4'
For a fair housing test to be successful, its target must be unsus-
pecting. The two essential skills that the testers must possess are the
ability to maintain secrecy and the ability to assume a false purpose
with credibility. Since these are not necessarily qualities endemic to
those accustomed to the candid relationships of an open society, the
success of the test rests heavily on the indoctrination, training, and re-
hearsing of dedicated testers.42
40. Between the 1968 passage of the Fair Housing Act and 1980, approximately 300
lawsuits had been fied by the Justice Department, or on the average 25 per year.
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1980, H. REP. No. 86, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(Apr. 1, 1980). The statistics for the 1981-1983 period were obtained from a tele-
phone interview on May 24, 1984, with Thomas Keeling, Chief, Housing and
Civil Enforcement Section, Civil Rights Division, Justice Department.
41. NATIONAL NEIGHBORS, RACIAL STEERING: THE DUAL HOUSING MARKET 20
(1973). The modem fair housing test is distinguishable from the testing em-
ployed through acts of civil disobedience that marked the early years of the mod-
em civil rights movement in this country. There the underlying objective was to
test the constitutionality of certain suspect laws and ordinances. In contrast, the
objective of the present day testing is to secure compliance of favored laws
through private litigation.
42. For example, the testers used in the federal government's national survey of hous-
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The specific skills that testers must acquire are unconventional at
best. For example, they are schooled to misrepresent their identities
and intentions, as well as to fabricate responses during the course of the
test to the extent necessary to conceal their true purpose.4 3 They are
also instructed to manipulate the target when necessary to obtain a cer-
tain reaction or a specific piece of information. As one tester manual
explains, "[slometimes the investigator has to fish for the property.
That is, instead of asking directly for the apartment or home in ques-
tion, he has to maneuver the agent or owner into offering him the
unit. 4
4
The requirements of secrecy and deceit are certain to repulse some
tester recruits. This has been anticipated in tester training programs
and those uncomfortable in their role are encouraged to withdraw. Or-
ganizers fear that uneasy participants may do a mission of such deli-
cacy more harm than good. A strong indoctrination can be helpful,
however, in overcoming tester reluctance. Emphasis on the tester's
righteousness of the cause, suggestive of an "ends justifies the means"
rationalization, is a strong thread running through tester instructional
literature. It would appear that participation in fair housing testing
may not be suited to those lacking a strong commitment to the purpose
for which the testing is undertaken.
IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO TESTING
The form of the fair housing test was influenced largely by the
peculiarities associated with securing evidence of sufficient credibility
to support a housing discrimination complaint in court. The prospect
of garnering evidence reflecting discrimination against a suspect class
led to the early technique of team testing. The technique enlisted a
non-minority tester to seek housing that had been denied the minority
tester to establish a basis of comparison.
Fair housing evidence generated by testing reached the courts in
ing markets were required to complete a thorough training course consisting of
four parts: "(1) Carefully reading this [training] manual, including appendices,
(2) Attending group training sessions, (3) Performing two practice audits [tests],
and (4) Participating in review and debriefing sessions." HUD STUDY, supra note
10, at 10 (Manual for Auditors).
43. Under a section entitled "Vignettes" in the Manual For Auditors, testers were
trained to anticipate and overcome situations where their real purpose might be in
danger of discovery by a curious or suspicious target. Set forth below is an exam-
ple of a hypothetical vignette:
(Q) The Agent says, "Are you a tester by any chance?"
(A) Do not answer directly. Ask a question instead.
"What is a tester?"
Show that the concept is incomprehensible to you.
"A what? What is that?"
Id at 3.
44. LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FOR METROPOLITAN OPEN COMMUNITIES, INVESTIGAT-
ING AND AUDITING IN FAIR HOUSING CASES 10 (1975).
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the late 1960's. The favorable reception it received in a series of early
cases encouraged further use and refinement of the technique. 45 The
federal government used extensive tester evidence in United States v.
Youritan Construction Co.,46 where in support of its allegations, the
Justice Department cited evidence from thirty tests conducted by black
and white testers over an eleven month period.47
The federal courts, acknowledging the difficulty of proving hous-
ing discrimination, have continued to ease the plaintiffs burden in fair
housing litigation. This policy decision by the courts has, in turn, al-
lowed a more expansive use of tester evidence in three areas of the
plaintiff's case. First, the courts have reduced the plaintiff's burden of
production in fair housing cases. Second, the courts have continued to
acknowledge the credibility of tester evidence. Third, testers have been
granted broader standing to sue.
A. Burden of Proof and Tester Evidence
Perhaps in recognition of the lack of an effective remedial scheme,
federal courts have become generous in construing the plaintiff's bur-
den of production in housing discrimination litigation. Although ear-
lier cases had required the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had
intentionally discriminated to establish a Title VIII violation,48 recent
decisions have adopted a prima facie concept to show a violation of
Title VIII. 49 Under this theory, borrowed from the employment dis-
45. See Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973); Martin v.
John C. Bowers & Co., 334 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. I11. 1971); Brown v. Ballas, 331 F.
Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971), af'd, 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Bush v. Kaim,
297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969); Harris v. Jones, 296 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Mass.
1969); Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio 1968). The
Supreme Court has also endorsed the relevance of disparate treatment evidence in
the context of employment discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
46. 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973), modifted, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975).
47. Yourilan, 370 F. Supp. at 655.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., 474 F.2d 1164, 1171 (5th Cir.
1973) (intent standard used to analyze defendant's liability under Title VIII), cer.
denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437
F.2d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1971) (intent standard used in Title VIII case).
49. See, e.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982) (prima
facie concept employed by courts in Title VII cases applies to Title VIII cases);
Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1331 (9th Cir. 1982) (significant discrimi-
natory effects flowing from rental decisions demonstrate a violation of Title VIII);
United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 576 (6th Cir. 1981) (municipal zon-
ing ordinance had discriminatory effect), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); Robin-
-son v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) (standard under
Title VIII is prima facie case); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th
Cir. 1978) (practices with discriminatory effects are prohibited by Title VIII); Res-
ident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977) (discriminatory
effect alone is sufficient to establish Title VIII violation), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908
(1978); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 555 (8th Cir. 1977) (prima facie stan-
dard applies to Title VIII litigation); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (discriminatory effects
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crimination field,5" the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of hous-
ing discrimination without showing the defendant's discriminatory
intent. Instead, the plaintiffs burden of production can be met through
the introduction of evidence of a racially neutral housing practice that
has a discriminatory effect.5
By introducing the prima facie standard of housing discrimination
claims under Title VIII, courts have acknowledged the difficulty of
proving the defendant's intent to discriminate.52 In addition, courts
have recognized that the statute is designed to remedy not only dis-
criminatory motivation but also the effect of discrimination in the
alone establishes a prima facie violation of Title VIII), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025
(1978). See generaly Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act,
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 199 (1978) (prima facie standard will help the Fair Hous-
ing Act end sophisticated as well as blatant discrimination, and eradicate practices
that operate to limit housing for minorities).
50. See Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128 (1976) (prima facie standard permits a method of
testing facially neutral housing practices that produce discriminatory effects in a
manner consistent with Title VIII).
51. See cases cited infra note 52. There are many factual patterns that suggest dis-
criminatory effect although not necessarily discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Phil-
lips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1982)
(residents committee exercised its right to purchase the property); Halet v. Wend
Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982) (refused to rent to persons with
children); Marable v. H. Walker & Assocs., 644 F.2d 390, 391 (5th Cir. 1981)
(refused to rent to unmarried persons); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d
1032, 1033-34 (2d Cir. 1979) (required approval from a resident committee); Bunn
v. Central Realty, 592 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (required refer-
ences from current or former occupants); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 552
(8th Cir. 1977) (refused to rent to divorced persons); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods
Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 896-97 (3d Cir. 1977) (preference given to
relatives of current tenants); Wang v. Lake Maxinhall Estates, 531 F.2d 832, 834
(7th Cir. 1976) (required approval of residents committee); Dillon v. Bay City
Constr. Co., 512 F.2d 801, 802 (5th Cir. 1975) (made a belated decision to transfer
property to a relative); Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1111 (2d Cir.) (im-
posed rules causing applicant to be financially unable to afford the housing), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 824-25 (8th
Cir.) (refused to deal with other than "qualified builders"), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1027 (1974); Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119, 1120 (7th Cir. 1974)
(no single men); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 483 F.2d 82, 83 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(rejected applicant on the basis of his offensive odor); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Re-
alty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 1970) (refused to rent to unmarried employed
persons with small children); Carson v. Pierce, 546 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D. Mo.
1982) (refused to rent to persons with too many children); McHaney v. Spears, 526
F. Supp. 566, 571 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (subsequent demand for cash only terms);
Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34, 36 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (refused to rent to under-
graduate students); United States v. Henshaw Bros., 401 F. Supp. 399, 401 (E.D.
Va. 1974) (refused to rent to military personnel below the rank of major).
52. See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283, 1288-90 (7th Cir. 1977) (focus on only intent allows racial discrimina-
tion to go unpunished absent evidence of blatant racism), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir.
1974) (prima facie case is proper standard under Title VIII because "clever men
easily conceal their motivations" concerning racial discrimination), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
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housing market. 53 As applied, courts have described the plaintiff's bur-
den under the prima facie rule as a four part inquiry in which the
plaintiff must show that (1) he is a minority; (2) he applied for and was
qualified to rent or purchase the desired dwelling; (3) he was rejected;
and (4) the opportunity to rent or purchase the dwelling remained
open.54
The qualified minority who applies for but is denied housing be-
cause of suspected discrimination has established the first three compo-
nents of the prima facie case. The minority can establish the fourth
element through discovery of the defendant's records or with greater
ease and economy through the use of tester evidence. If a white tester
subsequently applies for and is offered the dwelling at issue, the plain-
tiff has made out his prima facie case. Nevertheless, defendants will
often raise justifications for their conduct that, they allege, are purely
subjective, and demonstrate that their housing practices do not amount
to racial discrimination.55
A conflict exists among the federal circuits regarding the effect of
these justifications on the plaintiffs prima facie case.56 The federal
courts of appeal have employed three separate approaches. Under the
first, a court uses a four factor test to determine whether the defend-
ant's conduct has produced discriminatory effects sufficient to violate
53. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting
Supreme Court has emphasized need to construe Title VIII broadly), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 908 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85
(8th Cir. 1974) (in Title VIII cases effect, and not motivation, is gravamen), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
54. See, e.g., Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir.
1982) (prima facie case where black plaintiff was qualified to purchase, applied
for the house but was rejected, and the house remained on the market); Phiffer v.
Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 551-52 (9th Cir. 1980) (prima facie
case where qualified black applied for office, was told office no longer available,
and white applicant subsequently rented the office); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty,
Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) (prima facie case where minority could
afford to purchase the space sought, his application was denied, and the opportu-
nity remained open).
55. See cases cited supra note 49.
56. See Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (federal courts of
appeal have applied different standards in determining importance of discrimina-
tory effects). Compare Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 235-36 (8th
Cir. 1976) (Title VIII prohibits practices with racially discriminatory effects so
that the plaintiff need only establish that race was a factor in rejecting plaintiffs
application for housing) and Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Co. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977) (balancing of four critical factors
to determine whether a discriminatory effect is permissible under Title VIII) with
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-48 (3d Cir. 1977) (Title VIII
criteria must emerge on a case-by-case basis, but a rough measure can be made by
examining first whether the justification served a legitimate interest of the defend-
ant and second, whether the defendant could have taken an alternative course of
action that would allow his interest to be served with less discriminatory impact).
See generally Comment, Jusqfying Discriminatory Effect Under the Fair Housing
Act: A Searchfor the Proper Standard, 27 UCLA L. REV. 398 (1979) (balancing
test recommended as the most appropriate standard of review).
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Title VIII. Under this procedure, the court reviews the evidence of a
discriminatory effect, the showing of some racially discriminatory in-
tent, the defendant's interest in taking the challenged action, and the
nature of relief sought by the plaintiff.57 Under the second approach,
once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of produc-
tion shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the challenged practice
arises for a legitimate business reason.58 Under the final method, the
defendant's burden of justifying discriminatory effects is measured on a
case-by-case basis.59
Under each approach, once the defendant introduces evidence in
justification of his conduct the court must carefully view the facts and
circumstances surrounding the challenged action to determine if a Title
VIII violation has occurred. 60 Courts may infer discrimination from
the sequence of events surrounding the alleged conduct, and they have
generally viewed the defendant's subjective explanations with consider-
able skepticism. 61 Nevertheless, because the plaintiff retains the ulti-
mate burden of persuading the trier of fact that a Title VIII violation
has occurred, if he fails to dispute the defendant's alleged justifications
or fails to introduce evidence beyond that necessary to make out a
prima facie case, he may also fail to meet his burden of persuasion.
Tester evidence allows the plaintiff to build a stronger prima facie
case of housing discrimination that is less susceptible to attack by the
defendant's introduction of nondiscriminatory justifications for his
conduct. Defendants commonly allege two types of legitimate justifica-
tions for their refusal to deal with a minority homeseeker. 6a First, the
defendant alleges that the desired dwelling was not available at the
time the minority applied.63 Second, the defendant asserts that al-
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065-66 (4th Cir. 1982) (vio-
lation of Title VIII where: (1) plaintiff made a strong showing of discriminatory
effects; (2) plaintiff proved racial motivation; (3) defendant had no legitimate jus-
tification for his action; and (4) plaintiff sought only to restore status quo); Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290-93
(7th Cir. 1977) (four critical factors are discernable from previous cases: (1)
strength of plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) evidence of discrimina-
tory intent; (3) defendant's reasons for taking the action at issue; and (4) whether
plaintiff's request for relief requires the defendant to take action or seeks to re-
strain the defendant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
58. See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 827 (8th Cir.) (after plaintiff estab-
lishes prima facie case of discrimination, burden shifts to defendant to articulate
some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged practice), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 1027 (1974).
59. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977) (after re-
jecting the tests employed by the other circuits, Rizzo stated that the problem of
measuring the defendant's justification requires a case-by-case approach, and that
a defendant can rebut a prima facie case of housing discrimination only by show-
ing a legitimate interest in the challenged action).
60. See cases cited supra note 51.
61. Id
62. See Schwemm, supra note 49, at 239-41.
63. See, e.g., Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1983); Washington v.
[Vol. 13
Fair Housing Testing
though the unit remained open, there was some nondiscriminatory rea-
son for rejecting the minority applicant. 64
In both instances, tester evidence can be used to refute the defend-
ant's justification. In the first circumstance the strategy is straightfor-
ward: if a white tester subsequently applies for and receives the
contested housing, the plaintiff has effectively contradicted the defend-
ant's justification. As a result, the defendant cannot justify his refusal
to rent or sell the dwelling to the minority on the basis that the oppor-
tunity was no longer available. The second common defense-that the
plaintiff's application was denied on a basis other than his minority
status-is a more subtle excuse and therefore requires a more sophisti-
cated test to corroborate the plaintiff's suspicion of disparate treatment.
Cases in the housing discrimination area are replete with examples of
justifications given by defendants to account for the rejection of a mi-
nority application.65 Although the justification may seem feeble or ec-
centric, the defendant's conduct may correspondingly be difficult to
evaluate as a Title VIII violation. Despite this difficulty, if the plaintiff
can demonstrate that this facially neutral standard was applied in a
discriminatory manner, he will consequently rebut the defendant's
proferred justification.
The key to the plaintiff's case is his ability to prove that the de-
fendant's justification is merely a pretext for illegal discrimination. In
this situation tester evidence may be indispensable to substantiate the
plaintiff's suspicion that the subjective criteria were applied in a dis-
criminatory manner. The test must be carefully designed to eliminate
subjective differences between the minority applicant and the white tes-
ter so that common justifications are eliminated. To this end, the white
tester should be assigned economic, family, and social characteristics
that are slightly less desirable than the minority applicant. As a result,
if the minority applicant, for example, describes himself as divorced
with two children and an annual income of $15,000, the white tester
might characterize himself as divorced with three children and an an-
nual income of $14,000. The defendant who accepts the white tester
after rejecting the minority applicant will encounter difficulty in ex-
plaining his decision since he cannot justify his choice on income re-
quirements, social, or family characteristics. Therefore, tester evidence
allows the plaintiff to build a strong case of race discrimination that is
less susceptible to the defendant's allegations of nondiscriminatory
conduct.
In short, despite the reduction of the plaintiff's burden of produc-
tion in fair housing litigation, defendants will often interpose nondis-
Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982); Price v. Pelka, 690 F.2d
98 (6th Cir. 1982); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548 (9th
Cir. 1980); Blockman v. Sandalwood Apartments, 613 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1980).
64. See cases cited supra note 1.
65. See cases cited supra note 51.
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criminatory justifications for the rejection of the minority's application.
Although courts are split on the effect of the defendant's justification,
because the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion he stands a better
chance of convincing the trier of fact of discrimination if he can show
through tester evidence that the defendant's justification is merely a
subterfuge.
B. The Credibility of Tester Evidence
The issue of the credibility of tester evidence has been virtually
dormant. In light of the dubious nature of fair housing testing tech-
niques, one might anticipate that defendants would be successful in
challenging tester credibility. This has not been the case. While a few
courts have questioned the use of tester evidence,66 most consider the
use of tester testimony to be well established and necessary to produce
evidence of housing discrimination.67
A tester's credibility cannot be called into question simply on the
basis that as a tester he is automatically lacking in credibility. Indeed,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently ad-
vanced the view in Richardson v. Howard68 that tester evidence might
properly be accorded greater weight because testers are more likely to
be careful and dispassionate observers of the events in question. 69
Richardson involved a fact pattern typical of the first scenario men-
tioned at the outset of this discussion.7 ° Responding to a newspaper
advertisement, a minority called and confirmed the availability of an
apartment but was subsequently told in person by a white landlord that
the last unit had just been rented. Later that day the minority, without
identifying herself, again called the landlord and was told that two
apartments were available. Believing she was the object of race dis-
crimination, the minority contacted a housing activist group that con-
ducted a test at the apartment complex. A white tester was able to
verify that the landlord was apparently discriminating against minority
applicants.7'
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois discounted the testimony of the white tester, stating that this evi-
66. See, e.g., Wharton v. Knefel, 415 F. Supp. 633, 635-36 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (purpose
of tester's visit was to manufacture evidence), rev'd, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977);
Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 397 F. Supp. 256, 259 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (testers had
attitude of champerty), rev'd, 536 F.2d 231, 234 (8th Cir. 1976).
67. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Gladstone, Real-
tors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d
319 (7th Cir. 1983); Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081 (7th
Cir. 1982); Price v. Pelka, 690 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1982); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot
Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1980).
68. 712 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1983).
69. Id at 321-22.
70. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
71. Richardson, 712 F.2d at 320-21.
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dence had to be considered along with the fact that the witness was a
professional tester and had given false information to the landlord
under the pretense of obtaining an apartment.72 The Seventh Circuit,
however, reversed and held that the the district court had no reason to
question the testimony of professional testers simply because they are
acting as testers.73 The Richardson court noted that other jurisdictions
had repeatedly sanctioned the role of testers and that this information
often proved indispensable in establishing a housing discrimination
case. Moreover, the court suggested that it might be proper to consider
tester evidence more persuasive than other testimony in a fair housing
case.
74
The decision in Richardson is consistent with earlier cases that
have recognized that testers are competent to testify as witnesses in
housing discrimination litigation.75 The Seventh Circuit's enthusiastic
support for tester testimony, however, has been rare in other jurisdic-
tions. As a result, Richardson appears to expand previous decisions by
suggesting that because testers are careful observers of the issues and
disinterested participants in the litigation, their testimony should be ac-
corded greater weight than the self-serving testimony of the plaintiff
and defendant. Despite Richardson, before courts can consider testers
as independent observers, one must carefully examine the factual situa-
tions in which tester evidence is gathered to determine whether the test-
ers are genuinely disinterested in the litigation.
Where it can be shown that the tester is not a disinterested witness
or party, credibility considerations can have a dramatic impact on the
outcome of the litigation. For example, in Village of Bellwood v.
Dwayne Realty,7 6 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that the testimony of the testers was tainted with
an interest in the outcome of the case and, as a consequence, the court
was compelled to discount the tester testimony and rule in favor of the
defendants.77 Dwayne Realty is typical of the fact pattern found in a
case of racial steering." A racially integrated neighborhood gradually
became concentrated with black homeowners, thereby causing people
in the area to suspect that the emerging racial segregation was the prod-
uct of racial steering by real estate brokers. Next, a local housing ac-
tivist group sent testers to the defendant's real estate agency and
gathered evidence of what they believed constituted fair housing dis-
crimination. Finally, the testers and the neighborhood filed suit in fed-
eral district court alleging that the real estate firm was engaged in racial
72. Id at 321, rev'g No. 78C 2641 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1981).
73. Id at 321-22.
74. Id at 322.
75. See cases cited supra note 67.
76. 482 F. Supp. 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
77. Id at 1331-34.
78. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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steering.79
Although the Dwayne Realty court acknowledged that testers had
generally been considered competent witnesses in fair housing actions,
it found that the testers in that case had created testimony to corrobo-
rate evidence they expected to find.80 The credibility of each of the
four testers was placed in doubt following their cross-examination and
the direct testimony of the defendants. Although the testers stated that
they had not been shown properties in integrated neighborhoods, the
facts of the case proved otherwise.8' Moreover, the minority testers
called as witnesses by the plaintiffs indicated that the realtor had
treated them with respect and in a manner that the court felt was incon-
sistent with racially discriminatory practices.8 2
The Dwayne Realty court used strong language to criticize the role
of the testers in that case. The court contended that the testers had
initiated the lawsuit to advance their own economic or noneconomic
interests. In addition, the court noted that the testers had admitted
strong feelings against real estate brokers in general, and especially
against those located in the neighborhood that appeared to be moving
towards racial segregation.83 The court found that when such a witness
has an interest in the outcome of the case or has strong feelings against
a party, he has a tendency to see and hear the testimony he wants to
give. Finally, the court noted that in the testing situation these psycho-
logical considerations regarding the potential bias of the witness must
be taken into account along with the other evidence presented in the
case.
84
At first blush Richardson and Dwayne Realty appear inconsistent.
On one hand, Richardson states that tester testimony may properly be
given greater weight because testers tend to be more careful and dispas-
sionate observers of the events in question. On the other hand, Dwayne
Realty suggests that tester evidence should be considered in light of the
potential psychological bias in the sensory perceptions of the testers.
The difference in the decisions could perhaps be explained by the credi-
bility of the testers involved in the individual cases. Despite this plau-
sible explanation, the differences can be more adequately understood
by examining the underlying fact patterns that distinguish the type of
tester evidence involved in the two cases.
In the first place, the use of tester evidence always arises in a case
of suspected housing discrimination. This suspicion can arise in vari-
ous factual settings, as demonstrated in Richardson and Dwayne Realty.
In the Richardson situation, the suspicion of race discrimination is
79. Dwayne Realty, 482 F. Supp. at 1323.
80. Id at 1331-34.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1333.
83. Id at 1331.
84. Id.
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aroused by a person outside the housing activist organization who is
interested in a particular dwelling. The minority has knowledge of a
specific incident with a particular individual that he believes constitutes
housing discrimination. As in Richardson, the plaintiff himself may
conduct a test to verify his suspicion that the housing opportunity re-
mained open.85 This individual then contacts the housing activist or-
ganization with this detailed information. The organization then
conducts a test, limited to the housing opportunity at issue, in an at-
tempt to corroborate the plaintiffs belief that a housing discrimination
incident has occurred.
In a situation such as Richardson, where the scope of the test is
limited, the potential for prejudice or bias in the perception of testers is
consequently minimized. The white tester is used only to corroborate
the minority's suspicion of discrimination by providing evidence that
the housing opportunity remained open. The initial suspicion of dis-
crimination comes from outside the housing organization. Beyond this,
the suspicion is also strong enough that the minority is compelled to
contact the housing activist organization.
By contrast, the use of testers to prove a fact pattern evincing a
prima facie case of racial steering, such as that presented in Dwayne
Realty, is broader in scope and consequently has a greater potential for
tester bias and misconception. In a steering situation, there is a more
generalized feeling of discrimination that is not linked to a specific inci-
dent or particular realtor. Instead, the perception of a neighborhood
becoming racially segregated is linked merely by inference to a belief
that realtors selling homes in the neighborhood are engaged in the
practice of racial steering. Moreover, outsiders rarely complain to the
housing activist organization that they have been subjected to racial
steering. On the contrary, those who have been steered may be una-
ware or may even be grateful that the realtor has directed them to or
away from certain neighborhoods.
In a racial steering case, testers will attempt to confirm that the
realtor shows white testers listings in white neighborhoods and discour-
ages white applicants from homes in black or integrated neighbor-
hoods. Similarly, black testers will attempt to discover evidence that
they are steered to listings in black and integrated neighborhoods and
discouraged from dwellings in white neighborhoods. Thus, instead of
attempting to confirm a past incident of housing discrimination, the
testers seek to expose current discriminatory conduct. In short, the test-
ers themselves trigger the discriminatory practice.
The potential is significant that the preconceptions of testers will
bias the results of a racial steering test. Rather than seeking to corrobo-
rate independent evidence of housing discrimination, the testers must
personally create a situation in which disparate treatment can be
85. Richardson, 712 F.2d at 320-21.
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prompted and observed. The testers have deduced that since the neigh-
borhood has become segregated, the realtors selling real estate in that
area are engaged in the practice of racial steering. Because the form of
discrimination in a racial steering case may be as subtle as a hint, a
suggestion, or a failure to show a listing, the likelihood of misinterpre-
tation of the realtor's language or actions is thereby increased. Indeed,
the testers may be so convinced that steering is involved that they fail
to recognize facts basic to their case, such as whether the neighbor-
hoods to which they have been directed are integrated.86
This is not to say of course that testers in racial steering cases are
generally biased and allow preconceptions of housing discrimination to
blind their sensory perceptions. On the contrary, both Robinson and
Dwayne Realty recognize that professional testers can be credible wit-
nesses. Nonetheless, Robinson goes too far in stating that testers are
generally dispassionate observers and therefore more credible witnesses
than the parties themselves in housing discrimination litigation. This is
not always the case. In fact, in patterns similar to Robinson, where the
tester is seeking merely to corroborate that a specific housing opportu-
nity remained open, a tester's prejudice or preconception is not likely to
influence his testimony-either the housing opportunity remained open
or it did not. Alternatively, in a racial steering case such as Dwayne
Realty, evidence of housing discrimination is of a more elusive nature
and tester testimony is critical in distinguishing between a properly in-
tentioned suggestion and illegal racial steering. In these situations, the
trier of fact must carefully observe the statements and demeanor of the
tester to reduce the potential for tester subjectivity influencing the out-
come of the case.
C. Tester Standing to Sue
In general, standing is one aspect of the case or controversy doc-
trine used by courts to determine whether a claim falls within the lim-
ited subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.87 When a plaintiff
alleges a constitutional injury, he must clear two hurdles: Article III
considerations and prudential rules of judicial self-restraint.88 Despite
these hurdles, if Congress enacts legislation that implicitly or explicitly
grants standing to litigate a particular constitutional or statutory right,
the Court will generally accept the congressional decision to confer
standing and not impose prudential limitations on the claim.89 Thus, a
federal statute can remove the prudential consideration that normally
confines a plaintiff to the assertion of his own rights, not those of third
86. Dwayne Realty, 482 F. Supp. at 1325-28.
87. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION § 3531, at 176 (1975).
88. See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975).
89. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 81 (2d ed. 1983).
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parties. 90
It required several years of litigation to determine whether Con-
gress had removed prudential considerations from litigants under the
Fair Housing Act.9 ' In 1979, the Supreme Court determined that Con-
gress did not intend to limit federal court access to the complainant
experiencing direct injury in a discrimination complaint brought under
the Fair Housing Act. 92 Thus, the Fair Housing Act affords standing
equal to the constitutional limit.
With the elimination of prudential standing considerations, satis-
faction of the case or controversy standard of Article III remains as the
measure for Fair Housing Act litigants. Qualification for standing
under Article III entails demonstrating a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy sufficient to warrant federal court jurisdiction.93
Specifically, the litigant must show a distinct and palpable injury94 to
himself that is fairly traceable95 to the challenged action and that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.96
Article III requirements do not pose a significant impediment to
most prospective fair housing litigants. Direct victims of discrimina-
tion can easily demonstrate injury in fact, and indirect victims need
only show some actual or threatened injury that is likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision. 97 In previous decisions, the Court has
granted standing to indirect victims who alleged that they had been
deprived of the benefits of interracial association. In a 1972 case, the
Court found that black and white tenants of an apartment complex had
Article III standing in a suit against the owners for discriminating
90. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 737 (1972).
91. The decision came in two parts, reflecting the two separate enforcement schemes
provided by the Fair Housing Act. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that no prudential limitations existed on
plaintiffs who brought suit under the administrative enforcement section of the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976). See supra note 27 and accompanying
text. Seven years later, in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
(1979), the Court held that the plaintiffs were not barred by prudential considera-
tions under the section of the Fair Housing Act that allows immediate suit in
federal court, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
92. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); see also Note,
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood: Expanding Standing Under the Fair
Housing Act, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 783 (1980); Note, 57 U. DET. J. URBAN
L. 671 (1980) (discussing Gladstone, Realtors).
93. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962)).
94. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); see Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 114 (1979).
95. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978)
(quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261
(1977)).
96. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979); Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
97. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979).
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against minorities in their rental practices.98 In a subsequent decision,
the Court granted standing to a similar group of plaintiffs who had
made an analogous claim of deprivation of interracial association in a
twelve by thirteen block neighborhood because of the defendant's al-
leged racial steering.99 Beyond this, the Court has granted Article III
standing to a neighborhood as an indirect victim of racial steering. For
example, in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,' °° the Court
found standing in the plaintiffs allegation that racial steering had led
to a reduction in property values that resulted in a lower tax base and
therefore a decrease in the municipality's ability to provide local serv-
ices.' Although the Court analyzed the standing of various parties
who had alleged indirect injury, the Gladstone, Realtors Court ex-
pressly reserved judgment on whether a litigant tester had standing to
sue under the Constitution to assert a Fair Housing Act interest other
than his own. 0 2
Ostensibly to consider this and other standing refinements under
the Fair Housing Act, the Supreme Court granted review to a Fourth
Circuit decision, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman."3 In that case three
individual plaintiffs, a bona fide renter, a white tester, and a black tes-
ter joined with a housing activist organization, Housing Opportunities
Made Equal (HOME), as plaintiffs in a class action suit against a real-
tor for racial steering. The complaint stated that the black renter at-
tempted to lease an apartment at the defendant's complex but was told
no apartment was available. A black and white tester, employees of
HOME, attempted to determine if the defendant was engaged in racial
steering practices. The testers each made three separate inquiries re-
garding the availability of apartments and on each occasion the white
tester was told that an apartment was available while the black tester
was told just the opposite.' °0 In their complaint, the individual plain-
tiffs claimed injury based on denial of living in an integrated commu-
nity and the bona fide renter also claimed injury resulting from his
inability to rent property in a designated community. HOME claimed
injury on the ground that the defendant's racial steering practices frus-
trated the organization's purpose and consequently resulted in a drain
on its resources. All plaintiffs sought an injunctive relief, damages, and
attorneys' fees.' 0 5
On defendant's motion, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the claims of the two testers and
98. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 207-12 (1972).
99. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-11 (1979).
100. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
101. Id
102. Id at 111 (respondents did not press the claim that they had standing to sue as
testers and therefore the Court did not reach the question).
103. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
104. Id at 368.
105. Id at 369.
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HOME for lack of standing, but allowed the bona fide renter complain-
ant to proceed to trial. In the interim, the two tester plaintiffs and
HOME appealed the dismissal of their claims. The Fourth Circuit re-
versed and restored the standing of all appellants. 0 6
The Supreme Court in Havens Realty affirmed the decision of the
Fourth Circuit and held that testers who allege injury-in-fact have
standing to sue as plaintiffs under the Fair Housing Act. °7 The Court,
reviewing earlier decisions, first reiterated the rule that standing to sue
under the Fair Housing Act is free from prudential limitations. There-
fore, testers need only to meet Article III standing requirements and
allege that as a result of the defendant's actions the tester had suffered a
distinct and palpable injury.'" 8
The Court concluded that the Fair Housing Act expressly gave all
persons, including testers, a legal right to truthful information on the
basis of the Fair Housing Act's prohibition against misrepresentation 0 9
and its enforcement through the use of private attorneys general causes
of action.110 According to the Havens Realty Court, a breach of this
statutory right to truthful information results in an injury-in-fact that
meets the Article III standing requirement."' Because testers have a
statutory right to receive truthful information about housing, those test-
ers who are given false information thus have standing to sue under the
Fair Housing Act. Accordingly, the Court differentiated between the
posture of the white tester and his black counterpart by noting that the
realtor's alleged response to the white tester was truthful as to the avail-
ability of housing. Since the white tester's statutory right to truthful
information was not violated, he therefore had no standing to sue in his
capacity as a tester. 112
The concept of tester standing implies that a direct injury to the
tester complainant is at stake. The Court contrasted this first party
standing issue based on an individual's right to receive accurate hous-
ing information with the concept of neighborhood standing based on
the allegations that one has been denied the benefits of living in an
integrated community.' ' 3 In the latter situation, the primary injury is
to the neighborhood, and the complainant is injured secondarily, if at
all. A person claiming neighborhood standing must therefore first al-
lege the adverse impact on his neighborhood that may, in turn, indi-
106. Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980), afdsub nom. Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
107. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-75 (1982).
108. Id at 372.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1976).
110. Id § 3612(a).
111. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373-74.
112. Id. at 374-75. For a criticism of the Court's reasoning that the white tester did not
have standing, see Le Bel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critique and an Alter-
native Frameworkfor Analysis, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1013 (Court improperly read the
legal injury test into Article III requirement of standing).
113. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 375.
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rectly cause injury to himself as a resident or potential resident. Since
the white tester had also claimed neighborhood standing, the case was
remanded to the district court with instructions to allow the plaintiff the
opportunity to make factual averments sufficient to meet the Court's
neighborhood standing requirements." 4 Havens Realty thus makes
clear that testers may claim standing for two types of injury. First, test-
ers who are given false or incomplete housing information have stand-
ing for direct injury under Title VIII. Second, testers may claim
standing for indirect injury if they have been denied the benefits of
interracial association.
The decision in Havens Really is consistent with previous cases in
which the Court granted standing to testers who sustained direct injury
as a result of challenging the constitutionality of local statutes under
the Civil Rights Act." 5 Despite this consistency, the Supreme Court's
recognition of tester standing in Havens Realty significantly expands
the role of testers in fair housing enforcement. The Court, through its
interpretation of the Fair Housing Act, determined that testers who are
given false housing information are aggrieved persons under Title VIII.
This decision affects the enforcement of housing discrimination
through testing in two important aspects.
First, in the context of a racial steering claim, testers no longer
need to be residents of the neighborhood in which the alleged discrimi-
nation occurred. In previous racial steering decisions, testers had pred-
icated their standing on the denial of the benefits of living in an
integrated community. Havens Realty eliminates this requirement and
allows the tester to bring suit based upon the direct injury suffered
through the receipt of false housing information. Of course, if an indi-
vidual tester had received complete and truthful housing information
he would have to rely on neighborhood standing since he had suffered
no direct injury as a result of the test.
Second, and more significantly, Havens Realty can be read to en-
courage housing enforcement agencies to seek out violations of the Fair
Housing Act in the marketplace. Since testers are aggrieved persons
under Title VIII, it is no longer necessary for HUD or state and local
housing enforcement agencies or housing activist organizations to pred-
icate their actions on the receipt of actual complaints of discrimination.
On the contrary, the Court's recognition of testers as proper parties to
sue for direct injury under Title VIII encourages employees of these
agencies to test realtors or landlords whom they suspect of racial dis-
crimination on a random basis.
114. Id at 376-78.
115. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (black and white testers who attempted to use
restroom in a segregated bus terminal had standing to sue under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (black resident who attempted to
take a seat in the front of a segregated bus had standing to sue the municipality,
the bus company, and a company employee).
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V. COUNTERVAILING POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Judicial receptiveness to the practice of fair housing testing is now
well established. This is evident from the adoption of the prima facie
standard for claims under Title VIII and from the numerous unavailing
attempts to challenge the practice, particularly in the areas of admissi-
bility of tester evidence and tester standing to sue. As a result, fair
housing activists are now broadly licensed to litigate directly under the
Fair Housing Act based on testing. Consequently, the elements of a
private enforcement strategy calling for the expanded use of fair hous-
ing testing to threaten litigation and thereby force compliance are in
place. Ridding the nation's housing markets of illegal discrimination
in this manner would be realized largely through a process of judicial
regulation. An enthusiastic embrace of today's fair housing test as the
centerpiece of a national enforcement policy, however, should be tem-
pered by some of the countervailing implications inherent in such an
approach. Some serious and disquieting questions concerning the po-
tential for abuse, the costs, and the reliability of wide discretionary test-
ing need to be considered.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between two types of
testing activity. The fair housing test triggered by an act against a bona
fide renter or buyer is an appropriate and useful check on potential
housing discrimination. This test is narrow in scope and initiated at the
request of one outside the housing activist organization with a particu-
larized suspicion against a specific individual. By contrast, discretion-
ary testing driven by an interest in confirming preconceptions of racial
steering and other illegal practices can be dangerously grounded on
little more than conjecture and speculation. It is this latter application
of testing that introduces a number of serious policy implications.
Initially, the extensive use of private clandestine activity directed
against an unsuspecting citizenry presents an awkward fit in an open
society. Legally sanctioned undercover activity in criminal law en-
forcement continually presses the outer limits of official conduct. In
the absence of legal restraints on its use, the fair housing test can be
indiscriminately employed by the private citizen or organization. This
unfettered discretion to test raises practical concerns for its abuse.
Abuses in the practice of fair housing testing can take a number of
forms. In addition to the excessive zeal of well intentioned testers such
as those in Dwayne Realty," 6 abuses can be anticipated by those who
would choose to test for ulterior motives. These motives can include
the desire to seek monetary gain, harass, embarrass, extort, retaliate,
gain competitive advantage, and the like. The unfettered discretion to
target surreptitiously and direct covert activities against others, even in
pursuit of a laudable goal such as fair housing, is an important question
that should be addressed.
116. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
19841 239Fair Housing Testing
Baltimore Law Review
The economic burden on the target of a fair housing test may be
significant. Initially, the target must absorb the costs associated with
responding to the test and the costs attendant to any subsequent litiga-
tion, should it materialize. Litigation of course generates familiar costs
such as attorney's fees, court costs, and witness costs. Intangible inju-
ries difficult to quantify can also be present, such as a general stigmati-
zation, disparagement of the testing target's product, and injury to the
personal reputations of principals and employees. These injuries could
translate into actual losses in business revenue.
Short of litigation, however, the impact of the test itself can place a
substantial burden on its unsuspecting targets. Multiple tests con-
ducted against a single target are often recommended." 17 At a mini-
mum, each bogus tester visit draws on the limited time and energy of
the firm and its employees, generates expenses that must be absorbed
by the firm, and diverts the energy and efforts away from productive
activity.
This burden is particularly difficult to justify in those instances
where testing subsequently proves to have been unwarranted. Inherent
in any testing program is the troubling fact that a certain incidence of
those tested will in effect "pass" the test. In addition, a percentage of
those tested and subsequently sued will succeed in disproving the
charges against them. Combining these two groups with those tested
who are the targets of disgruntled clients, unprincipled business com-
petitors, and others intent on abusing the practice, one can envision a
class of testing casualties of some consequence.
Another area that deserves further examination is the proposition
that the modem fair housing test may lack sufficient reliability as an
instrument for detecting and securing evidence of illegal discrimination
to warrant large-scale application. Although substantial efforts have
been made in the design of the test and the techniques it employs in an
attempt to enhance its validity,"' a fundamental flaw may remain.
This shortcoming relates to the test's dependence upon objective sen-
sory impressions in an environment where objectivity is particularly
apt to be elusive. As an examination of the anatomy of the fair housing
test suggests," 19 the testing process itself demands a formidable psycho-
logical and emotional commitment from its participants. At best, this
commitment can complicate the tester's ability to distinguish between
what he is trained to detect, and what is perceived. Arguably, this in-
terest also could create a predisposition that also would attack the ob-
jectivity necessary for valid results. Factors such as these taint the
process and fuel the contention that the fair housing test is susceptible
to fabricating its own evidence and thereby making up its own case.
This same concern applies to testing techniques that are manipulative
117. See R. SCHIVEMAN, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 429-30 (1983).
118. See HUD STUDY, supra note 10, at v-vii.
119. See supra Section III.
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and encourage the test target to produce a certain reaction. 20 Conse-
quently, the trustworthiness of tester evidence stands suspect and re-
flects unfavorably on the proposition that the fair housing test should
play a central role in the context of a broad enforcement strategy.
Surely genuine disagreement exists as to the extent to which dis-
crimination has been eliminated from the nation's housing markets
since the enactment of the Fair Housing Act in 1968. The aggressive
and confrontational strategy of widespread testing as a means of attain-
ing universal open housing is counseled by those often harboring rising
expectations. Two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville insightfully de-
scribed the phenomenon of rising expectations that is helpful in under-
standing the enhanced expectations in housing enforcement today:
The evil which suffered patiently as inevitable, seems
unendurable as soon as the idea of escaping from it crosses
men's minds. All the abuses then removed call attention to
those that remain, and they now appear the more galling. The
evil, it is true, has become less, but sensibility, to it has be-
come more acute.'
21
The danger encountered in pursuit of a broad testing policy is that this
approach can aggravate more than advance the cause of integrated
housing under present conditions.
A substantial effort on the part of housing activist organizations,
the real estate industry, and various levels of government in the field of
fair housing has been underway in the sixteen years since passage of
the Fair Housing Act. There has been a good faith effort on the part of
the nation and its institutions to abide by the law's dictate of equal
housing opportunity.122 This national investment in a good faith effort
must be carefully weighed against the offensive and costly aspects of a
policy of widespread fair housing testing. Countervailing considera-
tions associated with the indiscriminate use of testing, suggestive of
universal noncompliance, may be inappropriate. New perspectives, ca-
pable of further advancing the cause of open housing without jeopard-
izing the gains and the reservoir of good will so painstakingly achieved
to this point, may better define the immediate challenge.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legislative attempts to solve the problem of housing discrimina-
tion have failed to provide an effective enforcement scheme for ag-
grieved parties. Consequently, complainants have been encouraged to
120. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
121. G. STEINER & J. STEINER, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIETY: A MANAGE-
RIAL PERSPECTIVE 33 (1980).
122. This is not to suggest that society has necessarily done the best it can nor
progressed as far as it might, but simply that gradually and patiently progress has
been made.
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litigate, not only on their own behalf, but as private attorneys general
in an attempt to end housing discrimination. The fair housing test has
gained considerable acceptance as the centerpiece for a national policy
of private enforcement of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Both the fed-
eral government and the courts have joined the fair housing activists in
contributing to this development. Starting in the late 1970's, the fed-
eral government funded a nationwide testing program in search of ille-
gal discrimination in the nation's major housing markets. Courts, in
turn, have been instrumental in encouraging the use of evidence pro-
duced from testing. The application of the prima facie standard to
housing discrimination claims has promoted the use of tester evidence
in both meeting the plaintiffs burden of production and in rebutting
the defendant's alleged justifications for his conduct. Moreover, courts
have continued to recognize the credibility of tester testimony. Finally,
the tester who has been given incomplete housing information has
standing to sue for direct injuries under the Fair Housing Act.
Despite these advances, courts have failed to distinguish between
the two distinct forms of fair housing testing. A critical difference ex-
ists between the test that merely attempts to corroborate the account of
a bona fide renter or buyer and the widespread use of testing to sub-
stantiate presumptions of racial steering or general suspicions of dis-
crimination. In the former setting, the circumscribed use of tester
evidence is an appropriate application of the private attorney general
concept. In the latter situation, however, the widespread use of tester
evidence introduces a number of disturbing countervailing policy
considerations.
First, the extreme measures employed by the fair housing test, cou-
pled with the psychological and emotional factors apt to attend its ad-
ministration, evaluation, and use place the validity of its results in
question. To this extent, its fundamental reliability as a test instrument
is suspect. Second, government-encouraged covert activities endemic
in an uncircumscribed fair housing testing policy can be easily abused.
In these instances the civil rights of every citizen stand in jeopardy.
Third, fair housing testing can also be questioned as an instrument too
blunt for a task that more appropriately requires the deftness of a scal-
pel. The extent to which widespread testing stands to injure innocent
targets is a troubling consideration. In this regard, extensive testing
may lack the requisite minimum efficiency or economy as a policy in-
strument. The costs to society associated with this form of testing are
significant and should be weighed in the balance.
To a large extent, public policy is as sound as the perspective
brought to bear in its formulation. How an expansive national testing
policy fits into the present day social and political milieu is the final
disquieting implication that must be evaluated. A policy that incorpo-
rates the aggressive and covert techniques of widespread fair housing
testing may no longer represent a viable course of action. Should this
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be the case, this testing policy would not only fail, but risks generating
widespread resentment and suspicion in precisely those segments of so-
ciety whose cooperation and good faith are essential to continued pro-
gress in open housing.
